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Is a Patent Small Claims Proceeding a Good Idea?
RFC Docket No. PTO–P–2012–0050
Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States
Colleen V. Chien1 and Michael J. Guo2
Submission to: ip.policy@uspto.gov
1. Introduction
Patent litigation is expensive. The primary motivation for the creation of a patent small claims
proceeding is to make enforcement more affordable. However, in the twenty or so years since the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) first endorsed the idea of a small claims patent
court through Resolution 401‐4, the patent litigation landscape has drastically changed. Although patent
litigation costs are still high, the equities have shifted. The marketplace for patents has developed,
providing more options than previously existed to monetize and assert patents. However, the cost of
patent defense has not gone down, and small companies cannot afford to bring meritorious defenses.
As a result, it is the high costs of defense that now presents a pressing concern. We do not believe that a
small claims patent court is the answer. Nonetheless, if a small claims patent court is to be adopted
anyway, we include some principles below that should help inform such a court’s creation.
2. Small Companies Suffer from Both the Underenforcement and Overenforcement of Patents
Though patent litigation is expensive across the board, it can be particularly unaffordable for
resource‐constrained litigants like startups and small innovators for whom the costs of litigation are
insurmountable. As described by one medical device executive, his company decided not to sue a large
corporation that was almost certainly willfully infringing his company’s patents covering PET scanners
because the cost and length of litigation would have been too great for the young startup.3 The costs of
defense have also been recognized as a huge problem for small defendants. More and more of them
seem to be finding themselves in the same position as college student Michael Karr who was sued by
the patent assertion entity Lodsys, and settled, because he “simply didn’t have the funds to continue on
with the lawsuit.”4 Even when cash is available, the costs can dwarf the benefits.
According to the 2011 AIPLA Annual Economic Survey, when less than $1 million are at risk for a
single‐patent suit, the cost may approach or exceed the benefits, to the tune of $490,000 through the
end of discovery and $916,000 inclusive of all costs.5 These are costs per party – litigation becomes even
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more unaffordable when both sides’ costs are factored in.6 This is less likely to be the case when more
than $25 million are at risk, where the average cost of $6 million per party is a fraction of the reward.7
Per Party Cost in Patent Litigation, as a Share of Value of Case
Based on AIPLA 2011 Annual Economic Survey Figures8
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The desire to fix this so‐called “underenforcement problem” led the ABA Section of Patent,
Trademark, and Copyright Law in 1990 to pass Resolution 401‐4, favoring “in principle, legislation for the
establishment of an expedited, low‐cost small claims procedure within the federal judiciary.”9
However, while the high cost of patent litigation harms small patentholders, it also can shield small
implementers of technology. From a consumer perspective, the underenforcement of patent
monopolies is socially beneficial to a point, because it reduces the barriers to competition that patents
pose. But high litigation costs have an endogenous benefit as well. They filter against the use of patents
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to extract nuisance‐driven rather than value‐driven settlements, in particular from small defendants
who themselves may not be able to afford to defend a case.
Just getting rid of a case is expensive.10 Although costs vary widely, each dispositive motion can
easily reach into the six figures to brief and file. The AIPLA estimates for each sides’ cost of litigation also
apply to the cost of defense. Even when the stakes are small or the claim non‐meritorious, the costs of
disposing of a case is high. Inter partes reexaminations, which address only invalidity based on printed
publications and are intended to be cost‐effective alternatives to litigation, may cost each party involved
$278,000 per patent; their replacement proceeding, inter partes review, is even more expensive.11 Such
reviews are also no guarantee that case costs will be avoided since courts are under no obligation to
stay cases pending inter partes review. Such exorbitant numbers prevent cases from being decided on
the merits and drive nuisance‐value settlements.
The potential for a small claims court to be used to harass defendants has long been recognized,
as the 1992 Report of the ABA’s Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, which endorsed the study
and consideration of a small claims court, stated: “One such effect would be the capacity of such a
system for creating a means for harassment and abuse. In this regard, if the proceeding imposes no cost
on the party bringing the action, a significant potential for abusive practices would be created.”12 Simply
put, a downside of creating a small claims patent court would be an “overenforcement problem,”
particularly against small entities.
3. Any Small Claims Patent Court Proposal Must Keep in Mind Small Defendants as well as Small
Patentholders
While we decline to endorse the idea of a small claims court, we think that any serious
consideration of this option must keep in mind both of these constituents: the small defendant as well
as the small plaintiff. It must be designed not only to enable small companies to enforce their patents
but also to enable small companies to operate free from patent harassment.
4. While Patent Enforcement Has Become More Affordable and Efficient, Patent Defense Still
Remains Expensive
We believe that in the time that has elapsed between when the idea of a small claims patent
court was initially introduced to the present, the equities have shifted, making patent overenforcement
10
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against small companies a more urgent problem than patent underenforcement. The advent of patent
assertion entities13 and rise of “patent litigation as an asset class”14 now means that plaintiffs have more
options for monetizing and financing their patent litigation cases. Patent assertion entity Acacia’s
website is filled with testimonials from small inventors like Paul Ware who report: “For 15 years I had
tried, without any success, to license my technology to many companies which use it to protect their
customers’ credit transactions. I had no credibility as an individual licensor and did not make any
progress. In just about two years, [Acacia has] licensed over 100 companies, including some of the
largest and best known retailers.”15 Patent assertion entities’ use of economies of scale by using the
same patent to sue multiple parties multiple times16 and contingent fee lawyers17 has drastically
reduced the costs and risks of enforcement for their patentee partners. Liquidity in the litigation finance
market has also created opportunities for investors and patentholders alike, and has, for example
“enabled the tiny single‐patent business from Toronto [i4i] to survive a protracted four‐year battle and
win US$300 million in damages.”18
On the defense side, however, no such market has developed, in part because the economics
are far less compelling. No matter what, a company that successfully defends against a patent suit is left
in a worse position than when it started. If it has not spent money on damages, then it has spent money
on legal fees, making the objective to get out of the suit as cheaply as possible. When money is scarce,
as it is for most startups, the toll goes beyond a financial impact. According to a survey of startups that
one of us conducted, 40% of respondents experienced a significant operational impact as a result of a
patent suit.19 This is why while we see contingent fee lawyers flocking to the plaintiff side,20 we do not
see it on the defense side. There is no comparable upside.

13

See generally Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) (describing patent assertion entities as “entities that
use patents primarily to obtain license fees rather than to support the development or transfer of technology”).
14
Jack Ellis, Patent Litigation as an Asset Class, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 43.
15
Testimonials, ACACIA RESEARCH GROUP LLC, http://acaciatechnologies.com/testimonials.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2013).
16
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement among Repeat Patent Litigants,
STANFORD LAW & ECON. OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 398 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677785 (documenting that most litigated (eight times or
more) non‐practicing entity patents lose more than 90% of the time in court); Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion
Entities, PRESENTATION TO THE DEC. 10, 2012 DOJ/FTC HEARING ON PAES (Dec. 10, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (stating that 61% of defendants named in 2011‐
2012 were sued by a PAE who had brought the case over eight times).
17
Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Table on Patent Trolls, Forbes, (Aug. 9, 2011, 11:37 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn‐the‐tables‐on‐patent‐trolls/.
18
Ellis, supra note 14, at 43.
19
Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, SANTA CLARA UNIV. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 09‐12 (Sept. 28,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251 [hereinafter “Chien Startups”],
at Abstract.
20
David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990651; Roven Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to PI: Yet Another
Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform, U OF TEXAS LAW, LAW & ECON RESEARCH PAPER NO. 211 (July 12, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1878966.

Companies making $10 million or less comprise 55% of the unique defendants named in patent
assertion entity cases,21 which now comprise the majority of patent cases and for some time have
named the majority of patent defendants to litigations.22 Litigation cost is still a problem, but it is the
cost of defense that is the more pressing problem.
The result: For small entities, the overenforcement problem is as, if not more, pressing than the
underenforcement problem.
5. Principles for Designing a Patent Litigation System to Help Small Companies across the Board
Although we decline to endorse outright the idea of a small claims patent court, we believe that
a patent litigation system that works for small companies should have at least the following
characteristics.
First, a patent small claims proceeding should allow the small entity to choose the lower‐cost
option when the stakes are below a certain threshold. During patent prosecution, the government
recognizes the need for lower costs for small entities: The USPTO charges lower fees for small23 and
micro entities.24 Yet, such lower‐cost options do not exist for litigation. In fact, many litigation‐type
proceedings progress in parallel, multiplying costs, rather than as true alternatives to one another.25 To
balance the equities, the size of the entities involved and their resources should be taken into account
during litigation as well. A small entity should not be burdened with a high‐cost litigation when a lower‐
cost alternative exists. The small entity deserves to have their case resolved for a fraction of the value
and not more than that, just as large entities do. In an ideal world, costs would be capped based on the
estimated value of the case.
Second, a small claims patent court should award attorney’s fees and costs to small company
defendants if they prevail.26 Although the current patent system has provisions for granting attorney’s
fees and costs, fee‐shifting is the exception—not the rule.27 Combine the low probability of a case being
deemed “exceptional” with the cost of bringing a Section 285 motion, and most defendants would
rather settle than fight even meritless claims. Awarding attorney’s fees and costs would help prevent
abuse of a patent small claims proceeding while enabling cases to be decided on the merits. Such a rule
would incentivize both patent plaintiffs and defendants only to litigate when the case has merit and
would encourage value‐driven—rather than nuisance‐driven—settlements.
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Third, a patent small claims proceeding should place strict limits on discovery with generous
clawback provisions and protective orders to keep costs low.28 Discovery now comprises the vast
majority of litigation costs and is an especially poignant problem for patent cases.29 Yet, very little
discovery actually yields truly relevant documents.30 Furthermore, patent assertion entity cases typically
have asymmetrical discovery costs. Patent assertion entities tend to have very few discoverable
documents, whereas defendants tend to have many discoverable documents, resulting in high discovery
costs for defendants while plaintiffs have low discovery costs.31 Strict limits on discovery combined with
generous clawback provisions and overly inclusive protective orders would drastically cut down on the
costs of document collection and review,32 which in turn would cut down on overall litigation cost.
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